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1 Introduction
The past decades have witnessed a dramatic rise in the degree of economic integration
across the globe. A notable feature of this phenomenon is the emerging role played by
less developed countries (LDCs) in world markets. Although trade between the US and
non-OECD countries is still relatively small, its share in US GDP increased by more
than fourfold between 1970 and 1995. In the same years, unprecedented episodes of
economic liberalization took place in countries like China, Mexico and India. As a result,
North-South trade is now the fastest growing component of world trade. This process of
international integration has been accompanied by concerns regarding the economic losses
due to weak protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in less developed countries.
The issue has become one of the most debated in international negotiations and led to the
inclusion of the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in the
statute of the WTO in 1994.1 After more than ten years, the extent to which LDCs should
protect intellectual property is still controversial. Moreover, despite the close connection
between IPRs and trade negotiations, the relationship between market integration and the
protection of intellectual property remains largely unclear.
This paper studies how North-South trade a¤ects the direction of technical progress,
growth and relative income in a model where less developed countries provide weak protec-
tion for intellectual property. Although it does not address the question of how to design
an optimal system of international IPRs regulations, it shows that the e¤ect of trade open-
ing on income growth and its distribution depends crucially on the degree of protection
of intellectual property worldwide. In particular, whenever poor countries do not provide
adequate protection for IPRs, North-South trade shifts the direction of technical change
in favor of rich nations. By making the sectors in which poor countries are specialized rel-
atively less productive, trade may thus amplify North-South wage di¤erences. Moreover,
the paper shows that integration of product markets with countries where intellectual
property rights are weakly protected may lower the incentives to innovate, even if the
market for technology remains unchanged, leading eventually to a slowdown in the growth
rate of productivity.
To obtain these results, the paper builds a Ricardian model with a continuum of
goods and endogenous, sector specic (directed), technical change. It describes a world
economy composed by two sets of countries, the North and the South, distinguished by
1The TRIPs agreement establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of IPRs and
a schedule for developing countries to adopt them.
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an exogenous pattern of comparative advantage. Except for these Ricardian di¤erences
and given that nowadays barriers to the ow of ideas are low, all countries have access to
the same stock of technical knowledge, that can be expanded by investing in innovation.
As in R&D-driven models of endogenous growth, innovation is nanced by the monopoly
rents it generates. However, the key assumption of the paper is that innovators can only
appropriate a fraction of the rents from the Southern markets because of weak protection
of IPRs.
The model is solved both in autarky and free trade and the equilibria are compared. In
both cases, the equilibrium has a number of desirable properties: the world income distri-
bution is stable, growth rates are equalized across sectors, countries with higher exogenous
productivity levels are relatively richer. But the world income distribution depends cru-
cially on the trade regime. Without trade in goods, each country produces in all sectors
and the South can free ride on innovation performed for the Northern markets. Under free
trade, instead, the two countries specialize in the sectors of comparative advantage and
benet from di¤erent innovations because they produce di¤erent goods. In this case, weak
IPRs imply that rents from the South are smaller so that the Southern sectors attract less
innovation. Thus, by making the sectors in which poor countries are specialized relatively
less productive, trade can amplify North-South wage di¤erences. At the same time, the
paper shows that trade with weak IPRs countries may reduce the growth rate of the world
economy. The reason is that, in the long run, trade equalizes the returns to innovation
across sectors and countries through a relative price change. Hence, the disincentive to
innovate due to imperfect IPRs enforcement in the South spills over to the North. An
interesting aspect of this results is that it applies despite the Northern market for new
technologies remaining fully protected by domestic IPRs and independently of the size of
the South.
The results of the paper are based on four assumptions: specialization driven by trade,
sector-specic (directed) technical progress, imperfect appropriability of prots from inno-
vation in developing countries and an elasticity of substitution between goods higher than
one. All of them seem plausible. That countries specialize in di¤erent sets of products,
at least to some extent, appears reasonable.2 More specically, the Ricardian model has
proven to be useful in the literature on trade and technology and the absence of factor price
equalization makes it particularly suitable for analyzing income di¤erences across coun-
tries. Several observations suggest that technical progress has a strong sectoral dimension.
2Ohlin went as far as to say that trade means specialization.
3
For example, R&D is mainly performed by large companies and therefore directed to their
range of activities. Although innovation certainly generates spillovers, Ja¤e et al. (1993)
show that these are generally limited to products in similar technological categories. In-
fringements of IPRs in developing countries appear to be signicant, as proven by the many
complaints of companies based in industrial countries. In this respect, the US Chamber of
Commerce estimated a prot loss for US rms of about $24 billion in 1988. Finally, gross
substitutability between goods seem realistic, as it yields the sensible prediction that fast
growing sectors and countries become relatively richer.
Although the main contribution of the paper is theoretical, it is nonetheless desirable
to assess empirically the validity of the mechanism it proposes. This is done in the nal
part of the paper, which aims at testing two key predictions of the model. The rst is
that protection of IPRs is most benecial in open countries, because specialization lowers
the scope for free riding on foreign IPRs. To test it, measures of protection for IPRs and
other macroeconomic variables have been collected for a panel of 53 countries observed in
the years 1965-1990. The main nding is that, consistent with the model, the correlation
between IPRs protection and GDP is higher among open countries. The second prediction
concerns the mechanism linking North-South trade to the pattern of R&D. According to
the model, an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries should
be followed by a fall in R&D investment at the industry level. Data from a panel of
US manufacturing sectors observed over the period 1972-1996 provide strong support
for this prediction and show that the impact of North-South trade on the direction of
technical change is quantitatively important. On the contrary, import penetration from
other industrialized countries does not have such an e¤ect.
This paper is related to various strands of literature. First, it is part of the literature on
North-South trade and endogenous growth. A common theme of some of these works (e.g.,
Young, 1991 and Galor and Mountford, 2003) is that trade opening may be less benecial
to LDCs if they specialize in the wrongsectors (i.e., those with low growth potential or
low human capital intensity). The result of this paper is more general in that it shows how
trade can shift innovation in favor of rich countries irrespective of the characteristics of
the sectors of specialization. Other works, such as Acemoglu et al. (2006), suggest instead
that the e¤ects of trade may depend on characteristics such as the level of technological
backwardness of a country or a sector. In comparison, this paper shows that the e¤ect
of trade may also depend on the level of protection of IPRs. In particular, the fact that
trade opening shifts the direction of innovation in favor of countries where IPRs are better
enforced is novel.
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The paper is also related to the line of research on appropriate technologies. Di-
wan and Rodrik (1991), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Saint-Paul (2007) argue that,
whenever countries di¤er in terms of technological needs or preferences, the enforcement
of IPRs can be instrumental to stimulate the development of the most appropriate inno-
vations. The contribution of this paper is to show that specialization in production due
to trade opening makes the technological needs of countries more diverse and may thus
exacerbate the problem of inappropriate technologies.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on imitation and innovation in a trading
world. Some contributions, including Helpman (1993), Glass and Saggi (1995), Dinopou-
los and Segerstrom (2004), highlight the potential downsides of strong IPRs protection, as
it restricts the e¢ cient allocation of resources across countries. Others, such as Lai (1998),
Yang and Maskus (2001), suggest instead that IPRs can foster growth and promote the
di¤usion of technology. Another group of papers, including Grossman and Lai (2004), Goh
and Oliver (2002) and Chin and Grossman (1989), study the incentives that governments
have to protect intellectual property in a trading economy. Although all these papers
made important contributions, they generally neglect the idea that technologies can be
inappropriate for developing countries and that IPRs protection can play a role in attract-
ing better technologies. None of them study how specialization a¤ects the direction of
technical progress and thus the type, rather than the quantity, of innovation. The present
paper lls this gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model,
solves for the equilibrium under autarky and free trade and derives the two main results:
that trade integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can amplify income
di¤erences and slow down the world growth rate. The model is then extended to study
imperfect market integration in the presence of non-traded goods. Section 3 presents
supportive empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes rst the simplest case of a single economy with full IPRs protection
(the North). The analysis is then extended by adding a second economy (the South) with
imperfect IPRs protection. Then, three distinct equilibria are compared: autarky, with
and without IPRs protection in the South, and free trade in goods with imperfect IPRs
protection. Finally, non-traded goods are introduced to study a case of imperfect trade
integration.
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2.1 Basic Setup: the North
Consider rst a group of advanced countries, called the North, taken in isolation. The
North is assumed to be a collection of perfectly integrated economies with similar charac-
teristics and full protection of IPRs. For now, we take technology as given and we omit
any time index. There is a continuum [0; 1] of sectors, indexed by i. Output of each sector,
y (i), is costlessly aggregated into a basket Y used both for consumption and investment:
Y =
Z 1
0
y (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (1)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods. The relative demand
obtained by maximizing (1) is:
p (i)
p (j)
=

y (i)
y (j)
 1=
: (2)
The basket Y is taken as the numeraire and its price index is therefore set equal to one:
P =
Z 1
0
p (i)1  di
 1
1 
= 1: (3)
Each good y (i) is homogeneous and produced by competitive rms using a range N (i) of
machines and labor, l (i):
y (i) = [ (i) l (i)]
Z N(i)
0
x (i; j)1  dj;  2 (0; 1) (4)
where  (i) is an exogenous index of labor productivity and x (i; j) is the quantity used
of machine j 2 [0; N(i)] available in sector i. Machines are sector-specic and depreciate
fully after use. Demand for machine x (i; j) derived from (4) is:
x (i; j) =

(1  ) p (i)
 (i; j)
1=
 (i) l (i) ; (5)
where  (i; j) is the price of machine x(i; j).
Each machine in each sector is produced by a monopolist. The unit cost of pro-
ducing any machine is a free parameter and is set equal to (1  )2 for convenience.3
3This simplication is immaterial because we are not interested in studying the e¤ect of changes in the
cost of producing machines.
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Together with isoelastic demand (2), this implies that all monopolists charge the same
price,  (i; j) =  = (1  ). Substituting  and (5) into (4), yields the quantity produced
in sector i as a linear function of the level of technology A(i)  (i)N (i) and employed
labor l (i):
y (i) = p (i)(1 )= A (i) l(i): (6)
Given the Cobb-Douglas specication in (4), the wage bill in each sector is a fraction 
of sectoral output. Therefore, equation (6) can be used to nd a relationship between
equilibrium prices and the wage rate:
w = p (i)1= A (i) : (7)
Since there is perfect mobility of labor across sectors, the wage rate has to be equalized in
the economy. Dividing equation (7) by its counterpart in sector j yields the relative price
of any two goods:
p (i)
p (j)
=

A (j)
A (i)

: (8)
Intuitively, sectors with higher productivity have lower prices. Solving (7) for p (i), substi-
tuting this expression into equation (3) and simplifying shows that the equilibrium wage
rate is a CES function of sectoral productivity:
w = 
Z 1
0
A (i) di
1=
; (9)
where    (  1), to simplify notation. Using (6) and (8) in (2) yields the optimal
allocation of workers across sectors. Integrating over the interval [0; 1] gives:
l (i) = L
A (i)R 1
0 A (j)
 dj
; (10)
Note that more productive sectors attract more workers (as long as  > 1) because the
value of marginal productivity of labor has to be equalized.4 Prots from the sale of a
single type of machine in sector i are a fraction  (1  ) =N(i) of the value of sectoral
output:
 (i) =  (1  ) p (i)1=  (i) l (i) : (11)
4Equation (10) provides an economic interpretation for : it is the elasticity of sectoral employment to
sectoral productivity.
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2.1.1 Equilibrium Technology
We now discuss the characteristics of technology and study its endogenous evolution. As
already stated, overall productivity in each sector, A (i), is the product of two components:
an exogenously given productivity parameter,  (i), and the level of technical knowledge in
sector i, represented by the number of machines N (i). While  (i) is xed and determined
by purely exogenous factors, such as geography, N (i) can be increased through innovation
as in models of endogenous growth with expanding variety of products. Thus, following
Romer (1990), the level of technical knowledge in a sector is represented by the number
of available machines, that can be interpreted as the extent of specialization.5 More
specically, innovation is costly, directed and sector specic: i.e., the innovator can choose
in which sector to innovate and a new machine in sector i cannot be used in any other
sector j. To design a new variety of machines, the innovator has to pay a cost of  units
of the numeraire. Once a new machine is discovered, the innovator is granted a patent
that entails a perpetual monopoly over its use. The patent is then sold to a rm that
becomes the sole producer of that type of machine. Free-entry in the R&D sector implies
that the present discounted value of prots from innovation cannot exceed the entry cost
. Along a balanced growth path with positive innovation,  (i) and r are constant (this
will be proved later) so that the free-entry condition can be written as:
 (i)
r
= : (12)
Using (11), (10), (9), (7) and setting  = (1  ), the above expression reduces to:6
L (i)

w
A (i)
1 
= r: (13)
For the remainder of the paper, we assume  2 (0; 1). On the one hand, the assumption
 > 0 (equivalent to  > 1) rules out immiserizing growth, whereby a sector (later on a
country) growing faster than the others would become poorer in relative terms. On the
other hand, the restriction  < 1 is required to have a stable income distribution across
sectors: it implies that if a sector grows more than another, its protability falls due to the
adverse movement of its relative price, discouraging further innovation. If this condition
was violated, it would be protable to innovate in one sector only and all the others would
5See Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey of this class of models.
6Setting  = (1  ) is meant to simplify the algebra only. It is innocuous, since the paper does not
study the e¤ects of changes in the cost of innovation .
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disappear asymptotically. This case does not seem very realistic and is thus ruled out.7
From this discussion, it should be clear that along a balanced growth path R&D must be
performed in all sectors so that they all grow at the same rate. For this to be the case,
the incentive to innovate has to be equalized across sectors. Imposing condition (13) for
all i, it is possible to characterize the long-run relative productivity across sectors:
A (i)
A (j)
=

 (i)
 (j)
 1
1 
: (14)
Equation (14) shows that, as long as  > 0 (i.e.,  > 1), innovation amplies the ex-
ogenously given productivity di¤erences  (i) = (j): in order to equalize the returns to
innovation, exogenously more productive sectors need to have a higher than average N(i).
For later reference, it is useful to express instantaneous prots as a function of exoge-
nous parameters only. To this end, integrate (14) across sectors and substitute it, together
with (10), (9) and (7), into (11) to get:
 =  (1  )L
Z
 (i)

1  di
 1 

: (15)
Thus, instantaneous prots are a CES function of exogenous productivities  (i) and pro-
portional to population L.
2.1.2 Households and the Balanced Growth Rate
We now consider the dynamic maximization problem of households and introduce the time
index when necessary. Consumers maximizes identical isoelastic preferences:
U =
Z 1
0
ln c (t) e tdt;
where c (t) is consumption and  > 0 the discount factor. The representative household
is subject to the dynamic budget constraint _a(t) = w(t) + r(t)a(t)   c(t), where a(t)
represents assets. Standard techniques yield the familiar Euler equation:
g(t) =
_c(t)
c(t)
= r(t)  : (16)
7When trade is allowed, this assumption yields a stable distribution of income across countries. Evidence
on this is provided by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002). In particular, they estimate  = 2:3 which, together
with a labor share  = 0:66, implies  = 0:85. Similar values for  are estimated by Epifani and Gancia
(2007). Thus, the restriction  2 (0; 1) seems empirically plausible.
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Using (12), (15) and (16) the balanced growth rate of the economy can be found as:
g(t) = g = L
Z 1
0
 (i)=(1 ) di
(1 )=
  : (17)
Note that the growth rate depends on the size of the economy. Yet, it is important to
stress that the main results of this paper do not hinge on this scale e¤ect (the Appendix
shows how it can be removed while preserving most of the analysis). Finally, we can verify
that c, Y and N all grow at the common rate g. To see this, write the resource constraint
of the economy:
c+ IX + IR&D  Y = wL

=
Z 1
0
A (i) di
1=
L; (18)
where IX = (1  )2
R 1
0 N(i)x(i)di is the cost of producing machines and IR&D = 
R 1
0
_N(i)
is the cost of innovation. Note that Y , IX and IR&D grow at the same rate as N(i).8 To
satisfy (18), consumption must grow at the same rate too.
2.2 Imitation and the South
Consider now a set S of less developed countries, called the South. From now on, the
subscripts N and S will be used whenever necessary to distinguish the North and the
South, respectively. The South is assumed to have a schedule of exogenous labor produc-
tivity, S = (S (i)), di¤erent from that of the North, N = (N (i)). These Ricardian
di¤erences capture the fact that geographic, institutional and economic di¤erences (taken
as given) make the South relatively more productive in some sectors than the North, even
when technical knowledge is common. Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), sectors are con-
veniently ordered in such a way that the index i 2 [0; 1] is decreasing in the comparative
advantage of the North, i.e., N (i) =S (i) > N (j) =S (j) if and only if i < j.
The way imitation is modeled follows Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) and emphasizes the quasi public good nature of knowledge, according to which ideas
can ow rapidly across borders. In particular, we make the following assumptions. First,
the North innovates while the South can only imitate.9 Second, technically, blueprints of
all inventions can be obtained costlessly, but legally imitators must pay a xed royalty
8Recall that A (i) = N(i)(i) and that x(i) is constant along the balanced growth path.
9This is a reasonable case. However, given that innovation is for the global market, the location of the
R&D sector is immaterial for the results.
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fee to the innovator.10 The royalty fee is parametrized by  2 [0; 1] representing the
fraction of the value of the blueprint in the South accruing to the original innovator in the
North. When IPRs are fully protected,  = 1, the royalty is exactly equal to the present
discounted value of the stream of monopoly prots earned from selling in the South the
machines produced with the blueprint. When  = 0, on the contrary, innovators do not
receive any payment from the Southern market. In all cases, however, the endogenous
component of technology, N(i), is identical in all countries and all machines are sold by
local monopolists.11 Thus, the role of  is just to determine how much of the revenue from
selling machines in the South accrues to the original innovator and can be interpreted as
an index of the strength of IPRs protection.12 Third, machines are nontraded, even when
trade in nal goods is possible. This assumption implies that, consistent with most patent
laws, rms in the South are never allowed to re-export copied machines to the Northern
market and is meant to simplify the analysis by ruling out competition between technology
rms in the North and the South.13 Forth, throughout, we maintain the assumption that
nal good markets remain fully competitive in all countries.
Note that, despite the fact that the North and the South have access to the same
innovations, their productivity will generally di¤er for two reasons: rst, because of the
exogenous di¤erences in labor productivity N and S , and second, as it will be shown
soon, because innovations may be more appropriate for a country than the other.
10The royalty fee is in terms of the aggregate Y . As in models of international nance, we assume that
payments of Y may be allowed even when there is no trade in y (i). Alternatively, the royalty fee could be
spent locally, for example, in training and supervising costs.
11 In the presence of any small imitation cost, assumed to be positive even when  = 0, no two rms have
an incentive to copy the same machine because price competition would lead them to negative prots.
12The obvious limit of this approach to IPRs is that the monopoly distortion in the South does not
depend on . This simplication is innocuous except for welfare analysis, which is not in the scope of
the paper. Alternatively, one could assume that imitated products are sold at marginal cost and model
IPRs protection as an additional per-unit cost that must be paid to the original innovator in the form of
royalties. For example, the unit cost inclusive of royalties could be dened as (1  ) (1 +    ), so that
S = N = (1  ) if  = 1 and S = (1  )2 < N if  = 0. The qualitative results of the paper would
carry over.
13Of course, in reality advanced countries do export technology and equipment to the rest of the world.
See, for example, Caselli and Wilson (2004) and Eaton and Kortum (2001). Yet, this evidence is not
inconsistent with the model if the rolyalty fee from selling machines in the South is interpreted as a form
of trade in technology and equipment. On the contrary, the fact that most of the world physical capital
is produced by a small number of R&D intensive countries is consistent with the view of this paper that
technology originates from the North only.
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2.3 Case I: no Trade in Goods and  = 0
Consider rst the simplest case in which there is no IPRs protection in the South (i.e.,
 = 0) and no trade in goods. In this case, the equilibrium in the North is the one
described in section 2.1 and is una¤ected by the presence of the South. In particular, the
state of technology across sectors, N(i), is given by (14) according to the exogenous labor
productivity of the North, N (i). The equilibrium in the South is characterized by a set
of equations analogous to those that apply to the North, with the di¤erence that machines
are copied and thus N(i) is taken as given from the North. Then, using equations (9)
and (14) it is possible to solve for the North-South relative wage, expressed in units of the
common numeraire Y :
!  wN
wS
=
" R 1
0 N (i)
=(1 ) diR 1
0 N (i)
2=(1 ) S (i)
 di
#1=
: (19)
First, note that @!=@N (i) > 0 and @!=@S (i) < 0. Intuitively, the relative wage is pro-
portional to the exogenous productivity of the two regions, N and S . More important,
the Appendix shows that the sectoral prole of technology is appropriate for the North, in
the sense that it maximizes YN , while it is appropriate for the South only in the limit case
in which N and S are proportional to each other so that there is no comparative advan-
tage (i.e., S (i) = N (i) ;8i, with  > 0 equal to a constant of proportionality).14 This
result extends the nding of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) that technologies developed in
advanced countries may be inappropriate for the economic conditions of LDCs.15 The Ap-
pendix also shows that, 8 2 (0; 1) ; ! is bounded bymax fN (i) =S (i)g = N (0) =S (0).
Lastly, since growth is due to the expansion of N(i) that are identical across countries,
equation (17) for the North gives also the growth rate of the South.
2.4 Case II: no Trade in Goods and   0
Consider now the more general case of imperfect protection of IPRs in the South:  2 [0; 1].
In this case, protability of an innovation is given by the sum of the rents from both the
14 In fact, it is optimal to have a relatively high level of technology N(i) in sectors where the exogenous
labor productivity (i) is already high. Copying the technology from the North, the South is using too
many machines in sectors that are originally not very productive. This ine¢ ciency lowers the wage in the
South.
15 In their model, this happens because of a skill-technology mismatch: the Northern technology is too
skill-biased for the skill-endowment of the South. Here, any source of comparative advantage captured by
N and S implies that the North and the South have di¤erent technological needs.
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markets in the North and in the South. Then, the free-entry condition whereby the value
of innovation must be equal to its cost becomes:
[N (i) + S (i)]
r
= :
Note that an innovator can extract only a fraction  of the prots from the Southern
market. Substituting the expressions for prots using (11), (10), (9), (7) and solving for
N (i) yields:
N (i) =
1

"
LNN (i)
 (wN )
1  + LSS (i)
 (wS)
1 
r
#1=(1 )
: (20)
The endogenous component of productivity, N (i), is now proportional to a weighted
average of the two exogenous indexes N (i) and S (i), with weights that depend on
country size, the strength of property rights and relative income. Case I is recovered from
(20) setting  = 0. Using (9), (20) and recalling the denition A(i)  (i)N (i), the
implicit formula for the relative wage is:
! =
8><>:
R 1
0 N (i)

h
LNN (i)
 + LSS (i)
 (!) 1
i=(1 )
diR 1
0 S (i)

h
LNN (i)
 + LSS (i)
 (!) 1
i=(1 )
di
9>=>;
1=
: (21)
Whether technology is closer to the Northern or Southern optimum, depends on which
of the two markets for innovations is larger (see the Appendix for further details). As
LS=LN ! 0, equations (21) approaches (19) from below. Therefore, the case of no IPRs
protection denes an upper bound for ! in autarky.
Finally, using (20), (9) and the Euler equation g = r  , the growth rate of the world
economy for the general case when  2 [0; 1] can be found as:
g =
Z 1
0
h
LNN (i) + LSS (i)
 (N (i) =!)
1 
i=(1 )
di
(1 )=
  : (22)
Note that the world growth rate is increasing in  because stronger IPRs protection trans-
late into higher rewards to innovation. As  ! 0, the growth rate declines to (17), dening
a lower bound for the growth rate in autarky.
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2.5 Case III: Free Trade in Goods with   0
Consider now the possibility to trade y(i) internationally. The exchange of goods between
the North and the South is protable because of Ricardian comparative advantage. Even if
technical progress is endogenous and identical everywhere, sectoral productivity di¤erences
across countries are xed by N and S , and so is the pattern of comparative advantage.
16
Recall that the ordering of sectors i 2 [0; 1] is decreasing in the comparative advantage of
the North, so that N (i) =S (i) > N (j) =S (j) if and only if i < j. This means that the
North is better at producing goods with a low-index i. Further, for analytical tractability,
the comparative advantage schedule, N (i) =S (i), is assumed to be continuous. As in
Dornbusch et al. (1977), the equilibrium under free trade and for a given technology can
be found imposing two conditions. The rst is that each good is produced only in the
country where it would have a lower price. This implies that the North specializes in
the sectors [0; z) where its comparative advantage is stronger and the South produces the
remaining range of goods (z; 1]. Given the continuity of N (i) =S (i), the North and the
South must be equally good at producing the cut-o¤ commodity z: pN (z) = pS (z).17
Using (7), this condition identies the cut-o¤ sector z as a function of the relative wage
under free trade !:
N (z)
S (z)
= !: (23)
For a given relative wage, (23) gives the pattern of specialization between the two countries.
Since comparative advantage of the North is decreasing in z, (23) traces a downward
sloping curve, , in the space (z; !). The second equilibrium condition is trade balance,
i.e., imports and exports have to be equal in value. Since total output in a country is
proportional to the wage bill and the demand share for a set [0; z] of goods is
R z
0 p (i)
1  di,
trade balance can be written as:
wNLN
Z 1
z
p (i)1  di = wSLS
Z z
0
p (i)1  di;
where the left hand side is the value of imports in the North and the right hand side is
the value of imports in the South. Note that, by homogeneity of tastes, the location of
16This is of course a simplication. Saint-Paul (2007) makes the same assumption, while Taylor (1994)
builds a model where comparative advantage is endogenous and may depend on IPRs policies.
17Since goods y(i) are produced by competitive rms, no one can undercut the price in face of foreign
competition. Further, given that each monopolist is innitesimal, it has no incentive to undercut the price
of its machine to make an industry more competitive.
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the nal demand for Y (including R&D spending) is irrelevant.18 Using (7), the trade
balance condition can be rewritten as:
w1+N LN
Z 1
z
A (i) di = w1+S LS
Z z
0
A (i) di: (24)
Along a balanced growth path, prots from innovation in any pair of sectors must be
equal. In particular, considering innovations for goods i and j produced in the North and
in the South respectively, the following research-arbitrage condition must hold: N (i) =
S(j). Substituting (11) for prots, noting that under free trade the optimal allocation
of labor (10) is lN (i) = LNAN (i)
 =
R z
0 AN (v)
 dv and lS (j) = LSAS (j)
 =
R 1
z AS (v)
 dv
and using (24), yields the relative productivity compatible with balanced growth:
AN (i)
AS (j)
=

N (i)
S (j)
1=(1 )
(!)=( 1) ; (25)
8i; j 2 [0; 1] with i < z < j: Compared to the case without trade, the relative productivity
of sectors still depends on the exogenous component  (i), but also on the IPRs regime
of the country where the innovation is used. Technology is still biased towards more
productive sectors (as  2 (0; 1), original di¤erences N (i) =S (j) are amplied) but also
against the Southern sectors where rents from innovation are lost (as long as  < 1).
Hence, equation (25) shows that under free trade weak protection of IPRs in the South
shifts technology in favor of the goods produced by the North.
Integrating i over [0; z] and j over [z; 1] in (25) and using (24), the trade balance
condition (TB), incorporating the research arbitrage condition that must hold along the
balanced growth path, can be rewritten as:
! =

1

 "LS
LN
R z
0 N (i)
=(1 ) diR 1
z S (i)
=(1 ) di
#1 
: (26)
Note that ! is increasing in z and decreasing in . Further, if  = 0 (or  = 1, as in the
Cobb-Douglas case), the equilibrium becomes independent of the sectoral distribution of
18Trade balance is here equivalent to market clearing:
YN = (YN + YS)
Z z
0
p (i)1  di;
where the left hand side is supply from the North and the right hand side is demand for goods from the
North. Royalty fees only a¤ect the split (YN + YS) on the right hand side, but leave the overall condition
una¤ected.
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Figure 1: Free Trade Equilibrium
productivity and the degree of IPRs protection. Conversely, if  = 1 the relative wage is
determined exclusively by IPRs protection: ! = 1=.
The long-run free trade equilibrium can now be found in Figure 1 as the intersection
of the two schedules  (23) and TB (26). The graph can be used to study the e¤ects
of weak IPRs in the South when international trade is allowed. From (26), a fall in 
implies an upward shift of the TB schedules which lower the relative wage in the South
and increases the set of goods produced there (z falls). Comparing (26) with (19), and
noting that lim!0 ! = maxN (i)=S (i), proves the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that parameters (LN , LS, N , S,  and ) are such to guarantee
positive long-run growth and  2 (0; 1). Then, there exists a level  such that if  < 
income di¤erences in free trade, as measured by !, are larger than income di¤erences
without international trade.
This is one of the main results of the paper: that trade can amplify income and produc-
tivity di¤erences if protection of IPRs in less developed countries is too low. Proposition
16
1 is based on the interplay between specialization and weak IPRs in developing countries.
First, trade and specialization imply that the North and South benet directly from dif-
ferent sets of innovations. Second, weak IPRs make innovations directed to the South less
protable. Hence, trade may shift technology in favor of rich nations. As  ! 0, R&D
is directed towards Northern sectors only and the income gap grows up to its maximum
(N (0)=S (0)), irrespective of any other country characteristics.
19 In autarky, instead,
even with  = 0, the South still benets from the innovations performed in all sectors for
the Northern market.
Another interesting result can be found by calculating the long-run growth rate of the
world economy in free trade (see the Appendix for the derivation):
gFT = LN
Z z
0
N (i)

(1 ) di
 1 


1 +
LS
LN
1
!
1=
  : (27)
Note that the growth rate of the world economy is increasing in : a higher  expands
the range z of goods produced in the North and decreases !, all e¤ects that contribute
to raising the growth rate in (27). The intuition is simple and is the common argument
in favor of IPRs protection: better enforcement of IPRs strengthens the incentives to
innovate and therefore fosters growth. What is more surprising is that the growth rate
of the world economy approaches zero if  is low enough. This is in contrast to the case
without international trade, where the growth rate is bounded from below by the growth
rate of the North economy taken in isolation (17).
The reason behind this result is that weak IPRs in the South spills over to North-
ern sectors because trade equalizes the long-run returns to innovation across sectors and
countries (i.e., N (i) = S(j)). In turn, this is possible because returns to innovation in
a given sector fall asymptotically to zero as the sector grows faster then the rest of the
economy, a consequence of  2 (0; 1). Thus, balanced growth is achieved by expanding
the Northern sectors up to the point where further investment in innovation for the North
is no more protable than it is for the South. This happens through a price e¤ect induced
by specialization: as the North specializes in a smaller range of sectors, the increase in
production per sector translates into lower relative prices and thus reduced protability.
Note that this result is independent of the size of the South and holds despite the Northern
19Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) show instead that trade leads to skill-biased technical change. However,
in their model trade generates productivity convergence and has ambiguous e¤ects on relative income,
even when  = 0 (the only case they study). The main reason for these di¤erent results is that they use a
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model with factor price equalization.
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market for new technologies remaining fully protected by domestic IPRs.20
Comparing the growth rate in free trade, (27), and autarky, (17), and noting that (27)
is a continuous function of  with lim
!b>0 gFT = 0, proves the following:
Proposition 2 For any  2 (0; 1), there exists a level  such that, if  < , the long
run world growth rate is lower when international trade is allowed.
In summary, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that if protection of intellectual property is
too low in less developed countries, trade integration can either amplify income di¤erences,
slow down the world growth rate, or both.21
2.6 Non-Traded Goods
The introduction of non-traded goods gives rise to a regime the combines the free-trade
and autarky equilibrium. Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), assume that a fraction t
of income is everywhere spent on internationally traded goods and a fraction (1  t) on
non-traded goods.22 In particular, dene consumption over two baskets of goods:
C = (Y )t (Y )1 t ;
where Y , representing the traded component of consumption, is still given by (1), while
Y  is a basket of non-traded goods. In this section, all variables related to the non-traded
sectors are denoted by an asterisk. To preserve symmetry, output of the non-traded good,
Y , is dened by a CES function over a new [0; 1] interval of (non-traded) products as in
(1). In fact, it is convenient to model the two sectors, traded and non-traded, as similar in
all respects and independent from each other, in that each sector uses its own output as
the only input to produce its machines and innovation. As before, the price index of the
traded good Y is set equal to one, while the price of Y  is P . Under these assumptions
and for given wages and technology, the equilibrium conditions in the traded sector are
20Note also that sector-specic technical process is crucial. In a setup with factor-specic innovations,
as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), the market size for any innovation depends on exogenous endowments
that are una¤ected by specialization and trade: for this reason, incentives to invest in R&D would never
go to zero even if  = 0. As a consequence, in Acemolgu and Zilibotti (2001) trade opening has no e¤ect
on the world growth rate.
21These results are derived in a model where growth is a positive function of market size. As already
stated, this scale e¤ect is not crucial for the main results. Given that the scale e¤ect is often considered
implausible, the Appendix show how to remove it.
22Non-traded goods can also arise endogenously in the presence of a trade cost. See Dornbusch et al.
(1977) for more details.
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almost unchanged. The only di¤erence is that, due to Cobb-Douglas preferences and
symmetry in market structure, only a fraction t of the total labor force is allocated in each
country to the traded sector. Likewise, equilibrium conditions in the non-traded sector in
any country can be derived as:
x (i) = [p (i) =P ]1=  (i) l (i) (28)
y (i) = [p (i) =P ](1 )= A (i) l (i) (29)
w = p (i)1= P ( 1)=A (i) (30)
w = P 
Z 1
0
A (i) di
1=
(31)
 (i) =  (1  ) p (i)1= P ( 1)= (i) l (i) ; (32)
where P  =
hR 1
0 p
 (i)1  di
i 1
1 
: These conditions are analogous to equations (5) (6) (7),
(9) and (11), with the di¤erence that the price of the non-traded basket is not normalized
to one. Hence, machines in the non-traded sector are sold at the monopoly price (1  )P 
(instead of 1   ). Finally, assuming that the cost of developing new machines for the
non-traded sector is  units of Y , the relative productivity among non-traded goods can
be found imposing the arbitrage condition:  (i) =  (j) ; 8 i; j 2 [0; 1].
For a given wage, the price of traded goods does not depend on the non-traded sector.
Thus, the condition for e¢ cient specialization is still given by (23). Trade balance is
also una¤ected, because every country spends the same share t of total income on the
traded goods. Thus, equation (26) still applies. However, the price of non-traded goods
will generally di¤er across countries. To take this into account, it is possible to rewrite
the equilibrium conditions (23) and (26) in terms of the real wages: !R = ! (P S=P

N )
1 t.
Using (31) to substitute for the price of non-traded goods yields:
!R =

N (z)
S (z)
tAN
AS
1 t
!R =  t
"
LS
LN
R z
0 N (i)
=(1 ) diR 1
z S (i)
=(1 ) di
#t(1 )
AN
AS
1 t
;
where Aj 
hR 1
0 A

j (i)
 di
i1=
, j = N;S, is an aggregate measure of productivity in the
non-traded sector, that will depend, among other things, on N (i), 

S (i) and . Note
that, as t ! 1 the economy approaches the free trade equilibrium. Conversely, as t ! 1
the wage ratio converges to the relative productivity of labor in the non-traded sector of
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the two countries, AN=A

S , which reduces to (21), just as in the autarky case. Similarly,
it is possible to show that the growth rate is given by a combination of the formulas valid
in autarky and in free trade.
At this point, it is instructive to isolate the mechanism emphasized in the paper by
considering a simple case in which the two countries are perfectly symmetric except for
the degree of protection of IPRs, . In particular, assume that the two countries have
the same size, LN = LS , the same productivity in the non-traded sectors, N (i) = 

S (i)
implying AN = A

S , and the same average productivity in the traded sectors. However,
the North and the South still di¤er in how the exogenous component of labor productivity
is distributed across the traded sectors. For example, assume that N (i) = S (1  i). In
such a situation, no country is inherently better than the other.23 Then, it easy to show
that the relative wage in autarky is one and that the following inequalities hold:
@!R
@t
 0; @!
R
@
 0; @
2!R
@@t
< 0;
i.e., the North-South wage ratio increases with the extent of trade (t) whenever IPRs are
not fully protected in the South. Further, the North-South wage ratio falls with IPRs
protection in the South (), the more so the higher the extent of trade (t). Moving back
to the general case, it is straightforward to use Proposition 1 to show that, if  is low
enough, real wage di¤erences will increase with the extent of trade (t).
2.7 Why Are IPRs Not Protected in the South?
The previous analysis suggests that Southern countries may benet from the enforcement
of IPRs. It is then interesting to ask why these policies are often not adopted. Although
this question goes beyond the scope of the paper, a number of possible answer come
to mind. First of all, enforcing IPRs can be costly, particularly in countries with weak
legal institutions. A second reason might be that a tightening of IPRs implies a prot
loss. Therefore, it may be optimal from the point of view of the South not to have full
protection of IPRs. Even when strong protection of IPRs is in the interest of the South,
the government might fail to implement the optimal policy for political reasons: if the
23The assumption that there is a pattern of comparative advantage in traded sectors (i.e., N (i) 6= S (i))
while there is none in non-traded sectors (i.e., N (i) = 

S (i)) is a simplication that captures, albeit in
an extreme fashion, what would be a general result if non-traded goods arose endogenously due to the
presence of a trade cost: that comparative advantage would be stronger among traded goods. The reason is
that non traded goods would be precisely those for which comparative advantage (i.e., the price di¤erence
between the two countries) is not strong enough to justify spending the trade cost.
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group of monopolists that enjoy the rents from imitation has more political power than
the workers, it may prefer to defend prots at the expenses of the rest of the economy.
Finally, in implementing IPRs protection, there might be a coordination problem among
Southern governments: each of them prefers the others to enforce IPRs, in order to attract
innovation, but has an incentive to free ride not enforcing these property rights itself.
However, this depends on the pattern of specialization and on the size of each country. If
each Southern country specialized in a di¤erent set of commodities, then the coordination
problem would disappear. Similarly, a large country would have a higher incentive to
protect IPRs because of its larger impact on world innovation and its limited ability to
benet from otherspolicies.
3 Empirical Evidence
The aim of this section is to assess the empirical validity of the mechanism proposed in
this paper. This is done in three parts. The rst is a test of the models prediction
whereby IPRs protection is most benecial in open countries, using cross-country macro
data. The second part is an attempt to test whether North-South trade has a¤ected
the pattern of R&D in an important way, using US industry-level data. The third part,
instead, compares the model to the existing literature and discusses the available evidence
in favor of the di¤erent approaches.
3.1 Trade, IPRs and Relative Income
A key mechanism of the model is that trade-driven specialization a¤ects the ability of a
country to attract better technologies by changing the level of protection of IPRs. While
a country in autarky can free ride on innovations from the rest of the world, trade-induced
specialization implies that countries benet from di¤erent innovations so that the scope
for free-riding is more limited. By increasing a countrys share of world production (and
prots) in the sectors of comparative advantage, specialization increases the impact of do-
mestic policies on protability of innovations directed to those sectors, thereby increasing
the ability of a country to attract technologies tailored to its needs. For this reason, the
model suggests the positive e¤ect of increasing IPRs protection of a country, i, on its
income to be higher under free trade than in autarky or, more generally, the larger the
extent of trade. Further, since the ability of a country to attract innovation for its own
sectors depends on its share in world production of those sectors, which in turn depends
on country size, the model suggests that the impact of i on productivity should be higher
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in larger countries.24 These implications can be summarized as:
@2
 
Yi=Y

@i@ti
> 0 and
@2
 
Yi=Y

@i@Li
> 0; (33)
where Yi is the real GDP per worker in country i, Y is the world average, Li is the size of
country i and ti the size of its traded sector.
To test (33), measures of GDP per worker, IPRs protection, openness to trade and
country size have been collected for a panel of countries from 1965 to 1995. GDP per
worker (GPDW) is taken from the Penn World Table 6.0 (PWT6.0). Two important
determinants of productivity are also included in the analysis to capture some of the
cross-country di¤erences in the : the stock of physical capital per worker (KL), from
PWT6.0, and the fraction of working age population with at least secondary schooling
as a proxy for human capital (HL), from Barro and Lee (2001). As for trade openness,
two di¤erent measures are considered: the Sachs and Warner (1995) index, which is a
dummy taking value one if a country is classied as open, and the trade share in total
GDP from PWT6.0.25 Although the rst measure is useful to distinguish countries under
di¤erent trade regimes, it exhibits almost no time variation in the given sample and
is therefore more appropriate for cross-sectional analysis. The second measure instead,
captures well the increase in market integration over time. Country size is measured by
total population (POP), as reported in PWT6.0. The last challenge is to nd data on the
degree of protection of intellectual property. In this respect, this study uses the index of
patent rights built by Ginarte and Park (1995). Although patents are only a component
of IPRs, they are likely to be correlated with the overall level of protection for intellectual
property. This index has also the advantage of being available for a large number of
countries with quinquennial observation since 1965. The index (IPR) ranges from 0 to
5.26 In summary, the overall dataset comprises a cross-section of 53 countries and 6 time
observations, from 1965 to 1990 at 5 year intervals.27 Descriptive statistics of the main
24This is the case in autarky, but also under free trade whenever there are countries specialized in the
same products.
25According to Sachs and Warner, an economy is classied as open if satises all of the following criteria:
(1) nontari¤ barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade (2) average tari¤ rates are less than 40 percent
(3) any black market premium was less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s (4) the country is not
classied as socialist and (5) the government does not monopolize major exports.
26This index is based on an assessment of ve aspects of patent laws: (1) extent of coverage, (2) member-
ship in international patent agreements, (3) provision for loss of protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms
and (5) duration of protection. An alternative, but time-invariant, measure of IPRs is provided by Rapp
and Rozek (1990). On the cross-section, the two proxies yield very similar results.
27Data are available for the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,
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variables are reported in Table 1.
To get a rst sense for the patterns in the data, Table 2 presents a set of conditional
correlations. The results are encouraging. As predicted by the model, IPRs protection
is associated with higher productivity only for countries classied as open by Sachs and
Warner. The correlation is zero for closed economies. Likewise, being open has a much
higher correlation with productivity in countries with strong patent rights. Also the second
prediction in (33) seems broadly consistent with the data, as IPRs protection is found to
have a higher correlation with productivity in larger countries.
To better display these correlation, we rst estimate with pooled OLS the following
equation:
GDPWit = b0 + b1(IPRit 5) + b2 (OPENit 5) + b3 (OPENit 5  IPRit 5)
+b4 (POPit 5) + b5 (POPit 5  IPRit 5) + a0 (Zit 5) + eit;
where GDPW is real output per worker, IPR proxies patent rights protection and POP
country size, OPEN is the Sachs and Warner openness index, and the matrix Z contains
other controls. All variables are in logs, except for dummies. To alleviate endogeneity
concerns, all regressors are lagged ve years.28 According to (33) the interaction terms
of IPR with both OPEN and POP should have a positive sign. Column 1 of Table 3
reports estimates for the equation above, with Z including two important determinants
of productivity, physical (KL) and human (HL) capital per worker. Consistently with the
model prediction, the coe¢ cient on both interactions is positive and precisely estimated.
Column 2 replicates the estimates in column 1 weighting the observations by country size
as measured by POP. This is an important robustness check, because the mechanism in
the paper is probably most relevant for large countries that can a¤ect world incentives.
Moreover, given the wide cross-sectional variation in population, it would be disappointing
to nd that estimation results are driven by very small countries. It is then reassuring to
nd that the coe¢ cients of both interactions remain positive and signicant. Column 3
provides an attempt to check whether the IPR protection variable simply acts as a proxy
Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Korea Rep., Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey,
U.K., U.S.A., Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. An asterisk () indicates no Sachs and Warner index
available.
28To avoid losing observations by using lagged values, the dependent variable, available for 1995, is
forwarded 5 years in the remainder of the empirical analysis.
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for the quality of institutions. For this purpose, an index of government anti-diversion
policies (GADP) and its interaction with openness are added to the estimated equation.
This index, taken from Hall and Jones (1999), has been used to measure institutional
quality and, like most other proxies of this kind, does not vary over time. Column 3 shows
that, as expected, the coe¢ cient for GADP turns out positive and signicant, while the
previous results are almost una¤ected.
Although the pooled OLS regression is a useful way to summarize partial correlations
in the data, it may place too much weight on cross-sectional variation and su¤er from
omitted variables, particularly given the small number of covariates. In this respect,
introducing country xed-e¤ects in the regression, so that eit = hi+uit, has the advantage
of controlling for omitted variables that change very little over time and that may be
correlated with other regressors, such as institutional and geographical characteristics of
countries. However, since this estimator uses only within-country variation, the Sachs and
Warner index of openness, with its almost nil time variation in the sample, is inadequate
(likewise, the institutional variable GADP cannot be included as it is already captured
by the country-e¤ect). The analysis therefore continues using the trade share in GDP as
a measure of openness. Before moving to the xed-e¤ects regressions, Columns 4 and 5
replicate the pooled OLS estimates of Column 1 and 2 with the new trade measure and
conrm the previous ndings: the two interaction terms are positive and highly signicant.
Columns 6-10 report the results from the panel xed e¤ect regressions. Column 6
includes all the right-hand side variables. The interaction term between patent rights and
openness is still positive and signicant. On the contrary, the coe¢ cient on country size
is now very small and not statistically di¤erent from zero. This is not surprising, given
that population varies mostly across countries (Table 1 shows that the cross-sectional
standard deviation of POP is almost three times its mean). It suggests that only the large
cross-sectional variation of country size may have a signicant impact on the e¤ectiveness
of IPRs. Column 7 and 8 show that the inclusion of time dummies and weighting the
observations by country size, respectively, do not a¤ect the results. Column 9 reports
the estimates after dropping the size variables, whose contribution to explain changes
in GDPW over time has been found statistically small. Finally, Column 10 isolates the
e¤ects of patent rights and trade, the main variables of interest, by dropping all the other
covariates. In all cases, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between openness and
patent rights is consistently found to be positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. To
conclude, this evidence suggests that a key prediction of the model seems to be, at a rst
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pass, consistent with the data.29
A few calculations on the coe¢ cients in Table 3 can help understand the magnitude
of the e¤ects and if the estimates across specications are comparable. Consider rst the
impact of intellectual property protection. For the average country, Columns 1-4-6 imply
that a 10% increase of the index of patent rights is associated with an output change
of  0:3%, +0:7% and +3:8% respectively. These numbers suggest that, for the average
country, gains from stronger IPRs may be uncertain. The situation is di¤erent for trading
economies: with openness one standard error above the sample mean, the reaction of
output becomes +3:7%, +4% and +5:1% respectively. Conversely, for countries closed to
trade (one standard deviation below the sample mean) the e¤ect may be negative:  4:3%,
 2:5% and +2:5%. Similarly, according to Columns 1-4-6, a 10% increase of the openness
index in the average country is associated with an output change of +2:9%,  2:1% and
+1:5%, respectively. In countries with IPR one standard error above the sample mean, the
positive e¤ect of trade is instead more pronounced: +5:5%,  0:3% and +2:2%. Finally, for
countries with IPR one standard error below the sample mean, the e¤ect of trade becomes
small or even negative: +0:3%,  3:9% and +0:8%. Although the variability of estimates
across specications is not unacceptably high, given that coe¢ cients come from regressions
using very di¤erent trade measures and estimation techniques, it makes it di¢ cult to draw
sharp empirical conclusions. However, these numbers indicate that open and perhaps large
economies might benet from stronger patent laws. It may thus suggest that the process
of trade liberalizations in India and China could be more benecial if accompanied by a
tightening of IPRs.
3.2 North-South Trade and the Pattern of R&D
The goal of this section is to test whether North-South trade a¤ects the direction of techni-
cal progress and thus the industry pattern of R&D investment. According to the model, in
a period of growing North-South trade, the innovative e¤ort of advanced countries should
become more specialized towards the sectors in which those countries have a comparative
advantage. Using data on a panel of US manufacturing industries, we test whether an
29Statements about causality cannot be made on the basis of this analysis because, despite the use of
lagged variables, endogeneity concerns may remain. Unfortunately, IV strategies relying on historical and
geographical instruments have little hope to solve the problem because the typical instruments have been
shown to be weak to identify separately the e¤ects of trade and institutions. The presence of interaction
terms and the need to distinguish IPR protection from other institutional variables make the problem
much worse. Developing an empirical strategy to address these issues goes beyond the scope of this paper,
but it would certainly be an interesting direction for future research.
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increase in import penetration from low-wage, low IPRs, countries is indeed followed by a
drop in R&D investment. The focus on US sectors is partly dictated by data availability,
but is also justied by the fact that the US economy represents the world leader in new
technologies.
The NSF Survey of Industry Research and Development (IRIS) provides annual data
on R&D expenditure at the 2-digit SIC industry level for the period 1972-1996.30 We
restrict the analysis to manufacturing sectors only, since they are more likely to be a¤ected
by trade. Annual data on industry-level output, proxied by the total value of shipments,
factor employment, investment, capital stocks and costs are available for all US 4-digit SIC
manufacturing industries from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Database, spanning the
period 1958-1996. For the same set of 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries, trade data
can be used to build two di¤erent measures of import penetration: the total import value
divided by domestic absorption and the import value proceeding from low-wage countries
only, divided by domestic absorption. This latter variable is taken from Bernard et al.
(2006) and will be used to measure North-South trade at the industry level. To build it,
Bernard et al. (2006) dene low-wage countries as those with a per capita GDP less than
5% of the US level. The set of countries representing the South according to this criterion
appears quite reasonable for our purposes: it is relatively stable over time, it accounts
for roughly 50% of world population and it includes the largest developing countries with
weak IPRs protection that are central for the analysis (i.e., China, India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, whose population accounts for 79% of the entire group).31
With this data, we can test if import penetration from the South a¤ects the pattern
of R&D investment in the US economy, as the model predicts. To do so, we regress the
series of R&D expenditure on the two measures of import penetration and a number of
control variables. Since R&D data is available for fteen 2-digit industries only, we rst
aggregate the data at the 4-digit level accordingly. The fteen industries are listed in
Table 5, together with some descriptive statistics that will be discussed later on.
We then perform a number of estimates of the following R&D equation:
R&Dit = + IMPit + IMP_Sit + 0Xit+i + "it;
30 In some cases, data are for groups of 2-digit SIC industries.
31Low wage countries in the dataset are: Afganistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros,
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique,
Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St.Vincent &
Grenadines, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen.
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where i indicates the industry observed in year t, IMP denotes total import penetration
and IMP_S import penetration from low-wage countries, henceforth the South. X is
a vector of control variables (output, investments, capital stock and the share of skilled
workers in total employment), i is an industry-specic component which is constant
over time, and "it is the iid error term. The model predicts that investments in R&D
should drop in sectors where import penetration from the South is higher, and is therefore
supported by negative estimates of .
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 4. The measure of R&D in use as
dependent variable varies throughout the columns. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent
variable is the log of R&D expenditure. The coe¢ cient for import penetration from the
South, negative and signicant, is in line with the prediction of the model. Interestingly,
the coe¢ cient for overall imports is instead positive, but smaller in absolute value than the
other one. Thus, while overall import penetration tends to increase investment in inno-
vation, the net e¤ect of import penetration from low-wage countries is negative. Column
2 conrms these results when controlling for industry output, skilled labor employment,
investment, capital stock and time e¤ects.
Starting from column 3, we use R&D expenditure as a share of industry output as
dependent variable. In this case, the coe¢ cient  captures the variation in R&D that is not
explained by proportional changes in the size of a sector, which may be in turn negatively
correlated with import penetration from the South. This means that the regressions
in columns 3-8 are more demanding on the prediction of the model. Nevertheless, the
estimates of  remain negative and signicant across all specications. Column 4 shows
that the negative estimate for import penetration from the South is robust to controlling
for time e¤ects and other covariates of R&D. In column 5 we estimate the same equation
as in column 4 weighting observations by industry size. The coe¢ cients conrm that the
sign and signicance of  are not driven by particularly small sectors. As in all empirical
analyses using linear models, concerns of reverse causality may arise. In particular, it
may well be that lowering R&D e¤ort makes import penetration from imitating countries
easier. Unfortunately, there are not many tools we can use to tackle this issue, given
that the limited number of sectors invalidates cross-sectional analysis. Nevertheless, as an
attempt to show that the estimates we obtained are not overly driven by reverse causation,
we regress the R&D share on 2-year lagged values of the RHS variables. If causality runs
from R&D investment to trade only, we should observe a much smaller (virtually zero)
coe¢ cient for the lag of import penetration from the South. On the contrary, in column 6
we still obtain a negative and signicant estimate of , with a coe¢ cient slightly smaller
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in size. This suggests that reverse causation, even if present, does not seem to be very
strong.32
The results in columns 1-6 refer to fteen industries, observed between 1972 and 1996.
If we could expand the R&D series from 2-digit to 4-digit industries, we would be able
to consider around 400 manufacturing sectors, so that our estimates would convey much
more information and would be more general. Although we do not have such data, we can
nonetheless exploit the high correlation between R&D and other variables in the dataset
(for instance, the simple correlation between R&D share and skill intensity is 0:62) to
perform a nal exercise that would give us a sense of whether the previous ndings are
likely to be robust at the 4-digit level. To do so, we rst estimate the following linear
equation for R&D shares on 2-digit industry data:
R&D_shareit =  0:036 + 0:134(Skillit)  6  10 7(Iit) + 2  10 9(Kit) +'0(ind) + it;
where ind is a matrix of industry dummies, it is an iid error and R
2 = 0:93. We then use
the estimated coe¢ cients to impute R&D share data for the 4-digit industries as:
R&D_sharej(i)t =  0:036 + 0:134(Skillj(i)t)  6  10 7
 
Ij(i)t

+ 2  10 9  Kj(i)t+ 'i;
where j is a 4-digit industry of the 2-digit sector i. With the imputed data at hand,
column 7 reports estimates for the equation:
R&D_sharejt = ~+ ~IMPjt + ~IMP_Sjt + ~
0
log(Yjt)+~j + t + ~"jt:
Notice that now we can only control for total industry output because the other variables
have been used to impute the R&D shares. Moreover, since around sixty per cent of the
industry-years have virtually no import penetration from the South, we weigh observations
by the share of industry imports sourced from low-wage countries. These new estimates
conrm the previous pattern, that the overall e¤ect of import from the low IPR countries
on R&D shares is negative and signicant. Finally, column 8 replicates the exercise of
column 6, with analogous results: import penetration from the South reduces R&D shares
even with a 2-year lag.
So far, the analysis suggests that import penetration from the South has a negative
32The reverse exercise of regressing import penetration from the South on lagged R&D investment yields
a much smaller (albeit signicant) coe¢ cient. This is again evidence that reverse causation does not seem
strong.
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and signicant impact on R&D investment. The nal step is to show that this e¤ect is
quantitatively large. This is done in Table 5, reporting a number of interesting industry
statistics for the years 1972-1996, together with the predicted impact of imports from the
South on the level of R&D expenditure over the period. For each of the fteen 2-digit
industries, the table reports in the rst columns the relevant SIC 87 codes, the R&D share,
skilled workers over total employment and import penetration (in percentage points) both
overall and from low-wage countries in 1972. The next two columns show the percentage
points increase of the two import measures. Note that while imports from the South were
close to zero in almost all industries at the beginning of the sample, by the end of the
period they have grown large in some sectors (up to more than 8% and 13% in Textiles
and Other Manufacturing, respectively). The last column reports the percentage variation
in R&D expenditure predicted by the increase in import penetration from the South over
the 25 year sample, using the estimates of column 1 in Table 4 and assuming that all other
variables (included import penetration from the other industrialized countries) remained
constant. The predicted impact of North-South trade on the industry pattern of R&D
is quite dramatic. All else equal, Textile and Other Manufacturing Industries (including
Leather and Toys), where imitation is easy and the comparative advantage of the South is
strong, would have su¤ered an 85 and 95 per cent drop in R&D investment, respectively.
On the contrary, R&D in sectors where the comparative advantage of the North is strong,
like Chemicals and Transportation Equipment (including Motor Veichles and Aircrafts)
would barely be a¤ected.
3.3 Revisiting the Literature
Some of the results in this paper stand in contrast with part of the existing literature. For
example, in the inuential trade models of Helpman (1993) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2004) stronger IPRs in the South can lower the incentives to innovate and increase the
North-South wage di¤erential. It is thus important to discuss the origin of these di¤erences
and the evidence in favor of the various approaches. The reason why IPRs protection can
discourage innovation in Helpman (1993) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004) is that
imitation in the South can free up Northern labor from production that can be employed in
the R&D sector. Depending on parameter values and specic assumptions, this e¤ect may
or may not dominate the negative impact of imitation on prots. Yet, it is unclear which
outcome is more realistic: although mixed, the evidence surveyed in Falvey et al. (2006)
seems to suggest that IPRs protection is more likely to stimulate innovation, rather than
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the opposite. Moving from this observation, in the present paper the tension is resolved
in favor of a positive link between IPRs and innovation by assuming that R&D does
not directly require labor, as in the convenient lab-equipment specication of endogenous
growth models.
Second, in Helpman (1993) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004) stronger IPRs pro-
tection in the South slows down technology transfer, implying a higher share of production
located in the North and lower Southern wages. This is the case because in those models
technology transfer happens through imitation only. While the evidence is still incon-
clusive, several studies reported in Falvey et al. (2006) show that IPRs protection can
actually speed up technology transfer. An informal look at the data also suggests the relo-
cation of production to the South to have increased at the same time as many developing
countries were strengthening IPRs protection, consistently with the present model. Thus,
the approach of this paper, according to which IPRs protection can be instrumental in
attracting technologies (and economic activity) seems at least equally reasonable.
The results of this paper are also consistent with a number of observations. The empiri-
cal ndings in Section 3.1 and 3.2 support the channel emphasized in this paper. Moreover,
the result that IPRs protection might be more e¤ective in open countries may help explain
the positive correlation between measures of IPRs protection and trade openness docu-
mented in Table 1 and in part of the empirical literature. The model also suggests that
trade opening may trigger a transition in which innovation is mostly directed towards
Northern sectors and, at the same time, economic activity is relocated from the North
to the South. Evidence of skill-biased technical change and outsourcing seems broadly
consistent with these predictions. Finally, the model suggests that market integration
may have increased the income gap between poor and rich nations. While the impact of
trade on di¤erent countries is a controversial issue, there are empirical works showing that
trade may have contributed to a widening of the cross-country income distribution.33 In
conclusion, while existing models have illustrated very important aspects of the complex
relationship between trade, IPRs and innovation, the complementary approach taken in
this paper seems at least equally plausible and appears to be useful in explain a number
of empirical observations.
33See, for example, Beaudry et al. (2002) and DeJong and Ripoll (2006).
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a simple model where market integration may amplify income
di¤erences between rich and poor countries and may lower the world growth rate. Rather
than raising warnings against globalization, the analysis has identied a specic market
failure, weak protection of intellectual property in developing countries, under which trade
can have undesirable e¤ects. Its main lesson is that, in a world of integrated economies,
prots from innovations play a crucial role in directing technical progress towards the
needs of all countries and in sustaining long-run growth. Even though the analysis hints
at potential gains from global IPRs regulations, it abstracts from the fact that enforcing
worldwide standards may be costly for LDCs and that the prots from their markets
may fail to provide the proper incentives for such reasons as high transaction costs or
expropriation risk. Given these imperfections, promoting research aimed at the needs of
the less developed countries appears to be a key element for reducing income di¤erences
and fostering world economic growth.
Before concluding, it is worth to mention some limitations and possible extensions
of this paper. The rst is the lack of welfare analysis. Although the main goal was to
illustrate a novel mechanism through which North-South trade may a¤ect the world income
distribution and economic growth, it would be desirable to study its e¤ect on welfare as
well. Unfortunately, such an exercise poses serious di¢ culties.34 Second, the paper is built
on the hypothesis that ideas can ow rapidly across borders and technological knowledge
(but not productivity) is the same across countries. While this view is not uncommon and
has empirical merits (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), it is nonetheless
possible that trade itself contributes to technology transfer between countries.35 Third,
infringements of intellectual property rights and rmsstructure have been modeled in a
stylized way. As a consequence, the model is silent on the role played by multinationals or
other organizational forms of production. Incorporating these elements into the analysis
would certainly help understand the complex interactions between innovation, imitation
and growth in a global economy and seems a fruitful direction for future research.
34 In this model, welfare comparison across trade regimes would tend to be arbitrary because it is hard
to measure comparative advantage and thus the gains from trade. Moreover, a more realistic description
of IPRs would be required. Finally, the analysis would be complicated by the need to compute welfare
along non-trivial transitional dynamics. A way to circumvent these problems could be to use a simpler
two-good model along the lines of Saint-Paul (2007).
35Evidence on the role of trade in promoting technology transfer is mixed. See Keller (2004) for a survey.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Optimality of technologies
Consider rst the case of no IPRs protection in S, ( = 0). The optimal sectoral prole
of N (i) is the solution to the following program:
MaxfN(i)gYN = LN
Z 1
0
[N (i)N (i)]
 di
1=
s:t:
Z 1
0
N (i) di = N;
where N is a positive constant. The rst order conditions (FOCs), 8i 2 [0; 1], are:
LN
Z 1
0
[N (i)N (i)]
 di
 1 

[N (i)N (i)]
 1 N (i) = 
where  is the lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint. Taking the ratio of any two
FOCs and using AN (i) = N (i)N (i) yields equation (14). This proves that the sectoral
prole of the endogenous technology maximizes Northern output and wage and hence it
is optimal for the North.
Consider now the case of imperfect protection of IPRs in S, ( 6= 0).
MaxfN(i)gYN + YS = LN
Z 1
0
[N (i)N (i)]
 di
1=
+ LS
Z 1
0
[N (i)S(i)]
 di
1=
s:t:
Z 1
0
N (i) di = N
the FOCs for a maximum are, 8i 2 [0; 1]:
LN
nR 1
0 [N (i)N (i)]
 di
o 1 

[N (i)N (i)]
 1 N (i)+
LS
nR 1
0 [N (i)S(i)]
 di
o 1 

[N (i)S(i)]
 1 S(i) = 
where  is the lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint. Using (9) and solving for
N (i):
N (i) =
"
LNN (i)
 (wN )
1  + LSS (i)
 (wS)
1 

#1=(1 )
Comparing this condition with equation (20) in the text shows that the sectoral distribu-
tion of the endogenous technology maximizes a weighted sum of Northern and Southern
aggregate output, with a weight of  on the South. As LN= (LS) ! 0, technologies
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maximize wS , whereas as LN= (LS)!1 they maximize wN .
5.2 Properties of the wage ratio in autarky
To show that the North-South wage ratio in autarky is bounded by max fN (i) =S (i)g =
N (0) =S (0), rst note that @!=@N (i) > 0 and @!=@S (i) < 0. Therefore, by con-
struction:
! =
" R 1
0 N (i)
=(1 ) diR 1
0 N (i)
2=(1 ) S (i)
 di
#1=

" R 1
0 maxN
=(1 )diR 1
0 maxN
2=(1 )minSdi
#1=
=
N (0)
S (0)
5.3 The growth rate under free-trade
Take the formula for the instantaneous rent appropriated by a technology monopolist in
the North:
N (i) =  =  (1  ) p (i)1= N (i)
LNAN (i)
R z
0 AN (v)
 dv
:
Note that, along the balanced growth path,  is equalized across sectors and countries,
with N (i) = S (j). Use (7) to substitute for wN and rearrange to get:
p (i)1  =

 (1  )

N (i)LNAN (i)
R z
0 AN (v)
 dv

:
Use AN (j) = AN (i)
h
N (j)
N (i)
i1=(1 )
to substitute AN (i)
 =
N (i)
=(1 ) R z
0 AN (j)
djR z
0 N (j)
=(1 )dj
. Inte-
grate over the interval [0; 1], use (3) and rearrange:
 =  (1  )
(
(LN )

Z z
0
N (i)

1  di
1 
+ (LS)

Z 1
z
S (i)

1  di
1 )1=
(34)
Finally, use (26) to substitute for
R 1
z S (i)
=(1 ) di. The Euler equation g = r  together
with the free-entry condition  = r = r (1  ) yield equation (27) in the text.
5.4 The model without scale effects
We now briey show how the scale e¤ect, e.g., the positive dependence of the long-run
growth rate on the level of population, can be removed without changing the main results.
Scale-invariant models of innovation have been developed by Jones (1995), Segerstrom
(1998) and Young (1998), among others. Here we follow Jones (1995) and Segerstrom
(1998) in combining population growth with increasing complexity in R&D. We begin
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by considering the North in isolation. Population grows exponentially at the exogenous
rate n > 0 (we shall assume that this is also the population growth rate of the South).
Households are modeled as dynastic families that maximize:
U =
Z 1
0
e ( n)t log c(t)dt;
where c(t) is per capita consumption and    n > 0. As it is well-known, the dynamic
optimization problem of the household subject to the usual budget constraint leads to the
familiar Euler equation for consumption growth (16).
To remove the scale e¤ect, we modify the R&D technology by assuming that the cost
of innovation grows with the stock of technical knowledge:
 (i) =  =  (1  )N; (35)
where N =
R 1
0 N (i) di and  > 0. This assumption captures the idea that technology
becomes more complex as knowledge expands.36 Along the balanced growth path, two
conditions must hold. First, the owner of a patent with value V (i) must be indi¤erent
between running the rm and investing its value:
 (i)
V (i)
+
_V (i)
V (i)
= r: (36)
That is, the dividend rate  (i) =V (i) plus the capital gain _V (i) =V (i) exactly meet the
rate of return on investment. Second, free entry requires the cost of innovation to be equal
to its value:
V (i) = V = : (37)
Substituting (35) and deriving (37) with respect to time we obtain:
_V
V
= g; (38)
where g is the growth rate of N . Substituting (37), (38) and (16) into (36) yields:
 =  [g (1  ) + ] : (39)
36Note that the cost of innovation in sector i grows with average N and not just with the measure of
technology in sector i. This assumption is not crucial, but has the important advantage of keeping the
cost of innovation  equalized across sector, as in the model in the main text. With this assumption, the
comparison between the model with and without scale e¤ects is most transparent.
37
As in the basic model with n =  = 0, the cross-section of technology is pinned down
by equalizing instantaneous prots in all sectors, still yielding equations (14) and (15).
Deriving (39) with respect to time and noting that  grows at the rate n (see 15) we nd
that, as usual in this class of models, long-run growth depends on population growth:
g =
n

: (40)
The expressions for instantaneous prots, wages and the cross section of technology, N (i),
are instead una¤ected by population growth. This implies that, once trade is allowed,
Proposition 1 is still valid.
Given that the long run growth rate now depends on n and , but not on , Proposition
2 takes instead a di¤erent form: IPR protection does not a¤ect the long-run growth rate
anymore, but it a¤ects when and how the economy reaches the balance growth path.
Preserving the spirit of Proposition 2, a move from autarky to free trade can trigger a
prolonged period of low growth. This can be seen, for example, comparing the ratio
N=LN (constant in the long run) in autarky and free trade when  = 0. In the case of
no trade and  = 0, this ratio can be computed equalizing (15) to (39) and using (35) and
(40):
N
LN
=

hR
N (i)

1  di
i 1 

n (1  ) +  :
From any initial condition, N=LN converges to a positive level given above.37
When trade in goods is allowed, the formula for the instantaneous prots appropriated
by an innovator is instead (34). Setting this equal to (39) and using (35) and (40), the
long-run, free-trade ratio N=LN is found to be:
N
LN
=

hR z
0 N (i)

1  di
i1 
+

LS
LN
 hR 1
z S (i)

1  di
i1 1=
n (1  ) +  : (41)
Note that, as  approaches zero, z falls to zero and so does the right hand side of (41):
lim!0
 
N=LN

= 0. But then, for the economy to reach asymptotically this long-run
equilibrium, a prolonged period of relatively low growth is required: for N=LN to fall
after trade opening, g must be lower than the long run growth rate n=.
37The denominator is always positive given the assumption   n > 0.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Cross-sectional Means (standard deviations) 
 
 IPR OPEN* OPEN KL HL POP GDPW 
        
1965 
 
2.47 
(0.59) 
.52 
(.50) 
46.69 
(25.69) 
7848 
(7703) 
19.82 
(18.39) 
26420 
(70771) 
16953 
(11608) 
        
1970 2.52 
(.67) 
.51 
(.50) 
50.37 
(29.52) 
10232 
(9265) 
23.51 
(19.61) 
29003 
(78764) 
18915 
(12248) 
        
1975 2.53 
(.67) 
.49 
(.50) 
57.83 
(29.51) 
12997 
(11394) 
26.11 
(19.95) 
31833 
(87549) 
20917 
(13244) 
        
1980 
 
2.69 
(.85) 
.52 
(.50) 
61.42 
(31.38) 
15190 
(12781) 
32.72 
(22.09) 
34782 
(97354) 
21347 
(14101) 
        
1985 
 
2.71 
(.89) 
.49 
(.50) 
60.69 
(35.42) 
16507 
(14154) 
35.59 
(21.63) 
37821 
(107662) 
23412 
(15666) 
        
1990 
 
2.75 
(.90) 
.70 
(.46) 
63.54 
(38.14) 
18754 
(16336) 
40.26 
(21.99) 
41039 
(118867) 
25433 
(16960) 
        
Panel B. Correlation (p-values) Matrix  
 
 IPR OPEN* OPEN KL HL POP GDPW 
        
IPR 
 
1       
OPEN* 
 
.413 
(.000) 
1      
OPEN 
 
.197 
(.000) 
.247 
(.000) 
1     
KL 
 
.561 
(.000) 
.523 
(.000) 
.105 
(.060) 
1    
HL 
 
.624 
(.000) 
.517 
(.000) 
.163 
(.004) 
.783 
(.000) 
1   
POP 
 
-.045 
(.424) 
-.064 
(.263) 
-.309 
(.000) 
-.061 
(.275) 
-.014 
(.801) 
1  
GDPW 
 
.591 
(.000) 
.616 
(.000) 
.153 
(.006) 
.863 
(.000) 
.805 
(.000) 
-.049 
(.376) 
1 
        
Note: OPEN* is the Sachs and Warner index of openness. Standard deviations in parentheses in Panel A. P-values for the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation in parentheses in Panel B. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Conditional Correlations 
    
Variable Conditional on CORR with GDPW # Obs. 
    
IPR 
 
OPEN* = 0 .003 
(.967) 
146 
IPR 
 
OPEN* = 1 .748 
(.000) 
166 
OPEN* 
 
IPR < 2.5 .238 
(.005) 
135 
OPEN* 
 
IPR ≥ 2.5 .726 
(.000) 
177 
IPR 
 
POP < mean(POP) .488 
(.000) 
254 
IPR 
 
POP ≥ mean(POP) .851 
(.000) 
70 
 
Note: OPEN* is the Sachs and Warner index of openness. P-values for the null hypothesis of zero correlation in parentheses. 
  
 
Table 3. Openness, IPR and GDP 
Panel Analysis. Dependent variable: real GDP per worker (GDPW) 
           
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS 
Weighted by 
POP 
OLS OLS OLS 
Weighted by 
POP 
FE FE LSDV 
Weighted by 
POP 
FE FE 
 
 OPEN = Sachs & Warner OPEN = Trade/GDP 
           
IPR -1.941*** 
(.697) 
-1.897*** 
(.664) 
-2.622*** 
(.749) 
-5.723*** 
(1.568) 
-5.303*** 
(1.556) 
-.407 
(.875) 
-.641 
(.885) 
-.611 
(.848) 
-.680* 
(.419) 
-.436 
(.475) 
           
OPEN 
 
-.437** 
(.200) 
-.419** 
(.194) 
-.368 
(.501) 
-.719*** 
(231) 
-.673*** 
(.226) 
.041 
(.098) 
.014 
(.102) 
.042 
(.097) 
.013 
(.097) 
.131 
(-110) 
           
IPR*OPEN 
 
.801*** 
(.265) 
.784*** 
(.263) 
.609*** 
(.209) 
.556*** 
(.212) 
.509** 
(.206) 
.216** 
(.105) 
.278** 
(.115) 
.241** 
(.111) 
.279*** 
(.106) 
.241** 
(.121) 
           
IPR*POP .163** 
(.065) 
.159*** 
(.060) 
.224*** 
(.071) 
.393*** 
(.089) 
.367*** 
(.089) 
-.005 
(.074) 
-.003 
(.073) 
.008 
(.069) 
  
           
POP -.207*** 
(.700) 
-.201*** 
(.067) 
-.258*** 
(.077) 
-.452*** 
(.092) 
-.423*** 
(.094) 
-.013 
(.113) 
-.002 
(.134) 
-.019 
(.133) 
  
           
KL 
 
.400*** 
(.075) 
.424*** 
(.078) 
.343*** 
(.078) 
.453*** 
(.073) 
.477*** 
(.075) 
.323*** 
(.034) 
.354*** 
(.038) 
.357*** 
(.039) 
.354*** 
(.038) 
 
           
HL 
 
.164* 
(.084) 
.136 
(.084) 
.160** 
(.079) 
.214*** 
(.080) 
.189** 
(.083) 
-.037 
(.036) 
-.016 
(.036) 
-.013 
(.036) 
-.016 
(.032) 
 
           
GADP   .772*** 
(.282) 
       
           
GADP*OPEN 
 
  -.053 
(.296) 
       
           
R-squared 
 
.83 .84 .85 .82 .83 .58 .61 .99 .61 .47 
# Obs. 
 
306 305 300 318 317 318 318 317 318 318 
Time Effects 
 
No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: All variables, except dummies, are expressed in logs. RHS variables are lagged (5 years). Standard errors (robust, in LS regressions) 
are reported in parenthesis. Constant not reported. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. Data Sources: Ginarte and 
Parks (1995) for IPR, Hall and Jones (1999) for GADP, Sachs and Warner (1995) for the dummy indicator OPEN, Barro and Lee (2001) for HL 
(share of population above 25 years with some secondary education), PWT 6.0 for the other variables. 
       
  
 
Table 4. North-South Trade and R&D at the Industry level (Fixed-Effects) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE FE FE FE LSDV  
Weighted by 
Y 
FE 
2-period 
Lags 
LSDV LSDV 
2-period  
Lags 
 
 Dep:Log(R&D) Dependent variable: R&D share in Y Dep: imputed R&D share 
Import  
 
11.486*** 
(1.088) 
1.396** 
(.703) 
    .092*** 
(.021) 
-.046 
(.029) 
    .056* 
(.034) 
-.052 
(.031) 
.0039*** 
(.0007) 
   .0031*** 
(.0008) 
         
Import  
(South) 
-35.426*** 
(10.266) 
-12.647*** 
(4.927) 
    -.937*** 
(.201) 
    -.727*** 
(.21) 
    -.597*** 
(.205) 
    -.564** 
(.264) 
-.0047*** 
(.0008) 
-.0038*** 
(.0009) 
         
Log(Y) 
 
 .529*** 
(.123) 
 .005 
(.005) 
.003 
(006) 
.01*** 
(.004) 
.0008*** 
(.0002) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
         
Skill 
 
 -1.476 
(1.055) 
 .138*** 
(.045) 
.166*** 
(.045) 
.049 
(.043) 
  
         
Log(I) 
 
 -.153** 
(.078) 
 -.011*** 
(.003) 
-.006 
(.004) 
-.005 
(.003) 
  
         
Log(K)  1.096*** 
(.157) 
 .016** 
(.007) 
.007 
(.008) 
.009 
(.007) 
  
         
Time dummies 
 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
 
.48 .91 .09 .29 .97 .22 .98 .98 
# Obs. 
 
259  259 259 259 259 231 8981 8314 
# Industries 
 
15 15 15 15 15 15 385 385 
 
Note: All variables are yearly observations between 1972 and 1996. Regressions in columns (1)-(6) are performed on US 2-digit industry-level 
data. Regressions in columns (7) and (8) are weighted by the share of import penetration from the South, and refer to US 4-digit industries. 
The series of imputed R&D shares is obtained from equation R&D_share=-.036+.134(Skill)-.6*10-6 (I)+.2*10-8(K)+ϕ(industry) (R2=.93), 
estimated on 2-digit industry-level data. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Data sources: NSF-IRIS for R&D expenditure at 2-digit industry level, Bernard et al. (2006) for 4-digit industry-level import penetration data, 
and NBER for the other series. 
  
 
Table 5. R&D shares, import penetration and the path of R&D (1972-1996) 
 
Industry 
SIC 87 
Code(s) 
% R&D 
share  
1972 
% Skill  
1972 
% 
Import  
1972 
% Import 
(South)  
1972 
 ∆(%Import)  
1972-96 
∆(%Import 
South) 
1972-96 
% 
 ∆(R&D) 
(predicted) 
         
Food, kindred, and 
tobacco products 
20, 21 0.21 30.14 4.06 0.35 5.75 0.41 -9.35 
         
Textiles and apparel 22, 23 0.11 12.35 7.25 0.60 24.16 8.17 -85.84 
         
Lumber, wood 
products, and furniture 
24, 25 0.18 14.58 6.08 0.16 5.19 1.18 -24.59 
         
Paper and allied 
products 
26 0.67 21.33 5.09 0.02 3.94 0.84 -18.31 
         
Chemicals and allied 
products 
28 3.27 37.22 5.95 0.32 7.19 0.13 -3.17 
         
Petroleum refining and 
extraction 
13, 29 1.74 29.08 4.37 0.02 7.28 0.42 -9.63 
         
Rubber products 30 1.74 21.44 4.41 0.01 13.16 2.71 -47.79 
         
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
32 0.88 20.84 7.59 0.05 8.72 1.55 -31.02 
         
Primary metals 33 0.47 19.26 10.06 0.17 12.93 1.42 -28.90 
         
Fabricated metal 
products 
34 0.50 23.14 3.81 0.02 7.28 0.70 -15.47 
         
Machinery 35 3.25 30.63 6.22 0.00 22.20 1.18 -24.62 
         
Electrical equipment 36 10.06 26.95 5.49 0.01 26.33 3.65 -58.31 
         
Transportation 
equipment 
37 (a) 27.51 10.82 0.00 11.75 0.33 -7.20 
         
Professional and 
scientific instruments 
38 3.84 40.75 8.61 0.02 17.40 1.69 -33.28 
         
Other manufacturing 
industries 
27, 31, 39 0.89 30.75 12.43 0.23 32.13 12.97 -95.51 
 
Note: Other manufacturing industries include printing, publishing and allied, leather and leather products, and miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries. The predicted variation in R&D expenditure between 1972 and 1996 is computed using the estimates in 
column (1) of Table 4, and assuming that only import penetration from the South has changed: ∆log(R&D) = (11.486  35.426)*∆(Import 
South). (a) Data on R&D for the transportation equipment industry are available from 1986 hence the initial R&D share is not reported.  
 
